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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT IN STATE
COURTS: CONVERSE ERIE PROBLEMS
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act1 provides that agreements
to arbitrate future disputes are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. ' 2
The Act is applicable to arbitration clauses in contracts evidencing mari-
time or interstate commerce transactions.3 Although section 2 grants
a substantive right,4 the Act itself does not afford federal-question juris-
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964). The Act was passed in 1925 to remedy three problems:
1. The delay incident to a proceeding in our courts, which, in centers of
commercial activity where there exists congestion of the court calendars, frequently
amounts to several years. Contributing to this delay are the preliminary motions
and other steps which litigants may take and the appeals which are open to them.
2. The expense of litigation.
3. The failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world. This failure may result either
because the courts necessarily apply general rules which do not fit all specific cases,
or because the judge or the jury is not and cannot be made familiar with the
peculiarities of the given controversy. A judgment by men particularly experienced
in the given field is one of the greatest advantages of arbitration.
Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law
and Its Application, 11 A.B.AJ. 153, 155-56 (1925).
2 A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving [interstate] commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof .. .shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). This section was designed to protect arbitration agreements from
judicial hostility. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978
(2d Cir. 1942).
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
4 "[iMt is reasonably clear that Congress intended by the Arbitration Act to create a
new body of federal substantive law affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitra-
tion agreements." Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
The Federal Arbitration Act could be grounded in either the power to enact sub-
stantive law for interstate commerce and maritime transactions or the power to prescribe
procedural rules for the federal courts. See, e.g., Committee on Commerce, supra note 1,
at 154. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Supreme Court
recognized that
[i]f the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it,
the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought.
For the remedy by arbitration... substantially affects the cause of action created
by the State .... The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may
make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Id. at 203. If the Act were purely procedural, contrary "outcome determinative" state law
would be controlling in diversity cases. To avoid this result, which would have emasculated
the Act, the Robert Lawrence court concluded that § 2 was the source of substantive
rights. As such, the states are bound to apply it under the supremacy clause. For a helpful
discussion of § 2 as a source of substantive rights, see Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2
of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a
Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
diction,5 and resort to the federal courts for enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement must be predicated upon one of the traditional bases of
jurisdiction. 6 When these are absent,7 state courts have jurisdiction over
the arbitration controversy.8
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.9 declared that
section 2 of the Arbitration Act was national in scope, "equally ap-
plicable in state or federal courts."'10 Since in many states the validity
of agreements to arbitrate future disputes is not recognized," proce-
5 Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.gd 1004, 1006 (2d Cir.
1933). "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28 . :' 9 U.S.C. § 4
(1964) (emphasis added). This language compelled the Krauss court's conclusion that the
Act itself does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in the federal courts. Accord, Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed,
364 U.S. 801 (1960).
6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33 (1964).
7 For example, when the arbitration controversy is between citizens of the same state,
or when the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less, there will be no recourse to the
federal courts. Id. § 1332.
The changes proposed by the American Law Institute in its Study of the Division
of jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1302(a), at 12 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as ALI Study], would prevent plaintiff"s invocation of diversity jurisdiction "in any district
in a State of which he is a citizen." If enacted, this provision could increase the number
of interstate commerce arbitration controversies brought in state courts.
Plaintiff as a strategic device may bring an action in the courts of the state where
defendant is a citizen; even if the requirements of diversity and jurisdictional amount
are met, defendant would be precluded from removing the action to the federal courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964). See also Victorias Milling Co. v. Hugo Neu Corp., 196 F. Supp.
64, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), which suggests that for purposes of removal of arbitration questions,
the party who first seeks judicial intervention should be classified as plaintiff. Section
1312(a)(2) of the ALI Study suggests that a defendant should be permitted entrance to a
federal court if he has a "federal defense," but he must still meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement.
8 Where a federal statute does not by its express terms provide for exclusive federal
jurisdiction, the states exercise concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876).
9 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 US. 801 (1960). The decision
provoked a veritable outpouring of law review commentary, most of it favorable. E.g.,
45 CoRarL L.Q. 795 (1960); 73 HAav. L. Rv. 1382 (1960); 108 U. PA. L. REv. 915 (1960).
10 271 F.2d at 407 (dictum). "If it is an exercise of the commerce and admiralty
powers, the act must apply not only to litigation in the federal courts but to suits in state
courts as well." Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,
386 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
11 Twenty-one states have made no legislative provision for enforcement of executory
arbitration agreements. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 829-44 (1960); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN., Rules
of Civil Procedure, Ch. 16, Rule 109 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-06 (1953);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-201 to -224 (1936); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to -910 (1948); IOw.A
CODE ANN. §§ 679.1-.19 (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-201 to -213 (1963); Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 417.010-.040 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 279-97 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.010-
.280 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 93-201-1 to -201-10 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-
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dural mechanisms for enforcing such agreements are often inadequate
or unavailable. Enforcement of the federal arbitration right poses
major difficulties for courts of these states, because they may apply
their own procedural law when enforcing a federal right'12 but may
not defeat the substance of a federal claim under the guise of regulating
procedure.13 A state court enforcing the federal right is therefore pre-
sented with problems similar to those that confronted the federal courts
after Erie' 4-determining both the limits of the substantive right to
arbitration granted by federal law and the points at which forum pro-
cedure may undercut that right.
In this converse of the Erie situation, 15 where a strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration has been indicated,16 the state court
should concern itself chiefly with fostering a uniformity of result in
the state and federal courts by giving effect to the federal right sub-
stantially as would a federal court.17 The policies and approaches de-
veloped in federal courts following Erie can serve as a fruitful source
of precedents and analogies. For example, the states should be con-
cerned that the fortuity of suit in a state court rather than in the federal
court "a block away" does not lead to a substantially different out-
2103 to -2120 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 38.010-.240 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to
-3-8 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-544 to -567 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29-01 to
-29-21 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1901 to -1905 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-501 to -519
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31-1 to -31-22 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.503-.507 (Supp.
1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to -10-8 (1966). Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont
have no statutory provision for commercial arbitration. In these states the common law
hostility to arbitration ordinarily precludes specific enforcement of executory agreements
to arbitrate. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gregg, 208 Okla. 291, 255 P.2d 517 (1962); Mead's
Adm'x v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 135, 74 A. 1058, 1059 (1910). See also M. DoAiKE, Trm LAw
AND PRACTICE OF COumERCAL ARBITRATION § 3.01 (1968).
12 See Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
13 Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949).
If the states afford courts for enforcing the Federal Act, they must enforce the
substance of the right given by Congress. They cannot deprecdate the legislative
currency issued by Congress--either expressly or by local methods of enforcement
that accomplish the same result.
Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 369 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Accord,
C. WRIGHT, FDERAL Couars § 45, at 149-50 (1963).
14 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15 See Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the
Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1956); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created
Rights, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1558 (1960).
16 The Supreme Court has recognized "the unmistakably clear congressional purpose
that the arbitration procedure.., not [be] subject to delay and obstruction in the courts."
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
17 See Hill, supra note 15, at 414.
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come.' 8 Making recourse to arbitration dependent upon the court in
which suit is brought would result in "forum shopping" by parties
no longer interested in arbitration.19 When parties to a contract re-
lating to interstate commerce intended that arbitration rather than
litigation be the method of solving commercial disputes, their expec-
tations should not be thwarted by state law. If they are, a consequent
"debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs" 20 might
jeopardize the considerable utility of arbitration.
Sections 3 through 5 of the FAA have been classified as part of
the procedural devices for the implementation of the mandate of sec-
tion 2.21 Section 3 authorizes any court of the United States to stay
trial of an action pending arbitration;2 2 section 4 grants district courts
the power to compel arbitration;23 section 5 allows the court to appoint
18 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. 460, 467 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 109 (1945). In Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Producing Properties, Inc., 203
F. Supp. 956 (S.D. Tex. 1962), an action on a contract containing a clause that provided
for arbitration of future disputes was brought in a Texas state court. Defendant, aware
that the agreement to arbitrate was no bar to the suit under state law then in effect,
sought to remove the action to federal court. Although the contract evidenced interstate
commerce, the district court was obliged to remand the case to the state court because
defendant could not establish diversity jurisdiction. To assure similarity of outcome the
federal court declared that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state law and stated
further that since the contract involved interstate commerce it was "the duty of the
State court to enforce the arbitration agreement." Id. at 959. Texas has since passed a
modem arbitration statute. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to -38-6 (Supp. 1969).
19 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938).
20 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Prior to Erie,
"citizens at the crucial level of everyday activity [were subjected] to dual and often in-
consistent systems of substantive law, without means of foretelling which system, in the
unforeseeable contingency of litigation, was going to apply." Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Ray. 489, 505 (1954).
Parties to arbitration agreements in interstate commerce contracts are similarly sub-
jected to uncertainty when they lack recourse to the federal courts. The suggested converse
Erie approach would alleviate this uncertainty by assuring that arbitration could proceed
in spite of contrary state law.
21 See Note, Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine"
in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588, 612-13. But see note 25 infra.
22 If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such
an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
23 "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
. . . may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
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arbitrators when the parties are unable or unwilling to do so. 24 The
sections are a means of preserving the right to arbitrate.25 When state
law is in opposition to these enforcement provisions, the federal right
itself may be threatened; state law should not control. 26 Where the
states lack similar enforcement mechanisms they could, by analogy,
apply the federal devices through use of their general equity powers
and thereby preserve the federal right.
The arbitration laws of some states provide that an arbitration
clause does not preclude an action on the contract,27 or that compliance
with an arbitration clause is not a condition precedent to bringing
such a suit.2s Such state law subverts the right to have a dispute set-
tled by arbitration. A party answering the suit might be held to have
waived his right to arbitration;2 9 failure to answer might lead to a
valid default judgment against him. When a previously existing agree-
ment to arbitrate is raised defensively as a bar to an action on the con-
tract and the agreement is validated by federal law, a state court should
give effect to the defense. It can do so by staying the action, as would
a federal court under section 3. 30
24 If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appoint-
ing an arbitrator . . . such method shall be followed; but if no method be
provided therein ... then upon the application of either party to the controversy
the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator ....
9 U.S.C. § 5 (1964).
25 Sections 3 through 5 are arguably so crucial to preserving the substantive right as
to become substantive themselves. The right to arbitrate is of little value if a concurrent
attempt to litigate can be successful. One party acting in bad faith could nullify the
right by refusing to proceed with arbitration, or by refusing to appoint an arbitrator when
arbitration is contingent upon such appointment. Cf. text at note 36 infra.
26 See note 13 and accompanying text supra. The concern of a state court seeking to
implement the § 2 right will be with following the mandate of Brown v. Western Ry.,
338 U.S. 294 (1949). In so doing, the court should consider whether or not the application
of its arbitration enforcement procedures will substantially detract from the federal right.
27 E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1952).
28 Id. See Big Vein Pocahontas Co. v. Browning, 137 Va. 34, 120 SXE. 247 (1923).
29 Filing an answer may have the effect of joining issue on the claim subject to
arbitration. DoMKE, supra note 11, § 19.01, at 181. But see Haupt v. Rose, 265 N.Y. 108, 191
N.E. 853 (1934), where the court held that a party could seasonably seek arbitration,
although a previous motion to dismiss the complaint in a pending action had been denied.
30 In Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
an action had been brought in an Oklahoma state court on a contract containing an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Oklahoma would not have enforced the clause. See
note 11 supra. By this kind of forum shopping plaintiff in the Oklahoma court could have
subverted defendant's right to arbitrate. The federal court had no power to stay the
state action under § 3 of the FAA but did so under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 in order to
protect and effectuate its decree compelling arbitration. 260 F. Supp. at 669. Section 2283
provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
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Some states allow a written agreement to submit to arbitration
to be revoked by a party, without justification, at any time before an
award is made.31 Section 2 of the FAA disallows the revocation, but
a state arbitration law might not provide for specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements.32 The remedy available at law for the breach
is clearly inadequate: the amount to be recovered for such revocation
is limited to the costs and damages sustained in preparing for and
attending the arbitration.83 Since section 4 of the FAA has been rec-
ognized as a mechanism for granting specific performance of an arbi-
tration agreement, 4 the states could preserve the arbitration right
by analogously compelling arbitration.3 5
A state statute terminating the arbitration agreement when the
parties cannot agree upon a method for appointing arbitrators3 6 under-
mines the right to arbitrate and should be supplanted by section 5
of the Federal Act, which allows for court appointment of arbitrators
in such a situation. Where state law has made no provision for the
appointment of arbitrators,3 7 the Federal Act could be adopted as a
guiding analogy.
The proper approach to this converse Erie situation was taken
recently by a New York court in In re Rederi.3 One party to a mar-
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The efficacy of this remedy is limited to situations in which a party can establish a basis
of jurisdiction in the federal courts.
31 See McClendon v. Shutt, 237 Miss. 703, 115 So. 2d 740 (1959); IDAo CODE ANN.
§ 7-903 (1948). MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-201-3 (1963) provides that if the submission to
arbitration is not made an order of the court it may be revoked at any time before the
award is made.
82 If the state law allows revocation of an arbitration agreement, the specific enforce-
ment machinery is patently unavailable. In Electrical Research Prods. v. Vitaphone Corp.,
20 Del. Ch. 417, 171 A. 738 (1934), the court held that specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements was unavailable in both courts of equity and courts of law. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-04-12 (1960) states that "[t]he following obligations cannot be enforced specifically ... (3)
tain agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration." But cf. note 35 infra.
33 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-910 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-201-10 (1963).
34 See, e.g., Necchi S.p.A. v. Nechi Sewing Mach. Sales Co., 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
35 In Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 143 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1966), the Supreme Court
of North Dakota specifically enforced an arbitration agreement contained in a contract
made and performed in Minnesota, even though North Dakota law prohibited specific
enforcement. See note 32 supra. In so doing the court recognized the substantive character
of laws governing arbitration and indicated that it was bound by the applicable conflict
of laws rule to follow Minnesota law. A similar situation will confront state courts when
rights under the FAA are claimed. A court could treat the question as one of conflict
of laws and thus enforce an arbitration agreement in spite of its own statute.
36 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 103 (1967).
37 The arbitration statutes of Colorado and New Mexico make no such provision.
38 31 App. Div. 2d 372, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1st Dep't 1969).
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itime contract 9 that provided for arbitration of future disputes
demanded arbitration; the other sought to stay arbitration under the
limitations provision of the New York arbitration statute40 on the
ground that the claims were untimely.41 The state court reasoned that
since the Federal Arbitration Act was based on the "exclusive Fed-
eral power over interstate commerce and over admiralty" 42 and since
the Act created "national substantive rights governed by Federal and
not State law,' 43 the FAA was controlling. The court determined that
under section 4 of the Act it could consider only the issues of the mak-
ing of the agreement and the failure to comply with it, and that the
issue of time limitation would therefore have to be decided in arbitra-
tion.44 The result reached in Rederi is a sound one.45 When rights
to arbitration based on the FAA are asserted in state courts, they should
be enforced. By giving effect to the paramount federal law, the state
will ensure uniformity of outcome in state and federal courts, prevent
forum shopping, and promote the use of arbitration in interstate com-
merce and maritime transactions.
89 State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over arbitration controversies related to
admiralty matters under the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
40 If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of inten-
tion to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been
barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party
may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration.
N.Y. Crv. PRac. LAw § 7502(b) (McKinney 1963).
41 Petitioner's resort to the state court may have been an attempt to obtain a forum
amenable to the contention that the claims were untimely. The contention was based on
a contract clause that entitled petitioner to rights, privileges, and immunities contained
in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1964). The Act provides that a
carrier shall be discharged from all liability unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods. In a federal court the contention would have been no bar to arbitra-
tion because arbitration is not within the term "suit" as used in that statute. Son Shipping
Co. v. De Fosse & Tanghe, 199 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir. 1952).
42 31 App. Div. 2d at 373, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 1013, citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 US. 395 (1967).
43 31 App. Div. 2d at 373, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 1013, citing Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
44 31 App. Div. 2d at 373, 297 N.YS.2d at 1013. See also Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield, 204 F.2d 366, 369 n.9(c) (2d Cir. 1953), where the court
stated: "We assume, arguendo, that, although the federal arbitration statute governs here
for jurisdictional purposes, the New York statute of limitations applies since there is no
federal statute of limitations."
45 Compare Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657
(1950), where the court held that when "an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by
invoking the Federal Arbitration Act, in the courts of this State the issue is one of
procedure and not of substantive right, and the laws of this state are controlling." Id.
at 160, 43 N.W.2d at 659 (syllabus of the court). By this reasoning the Nebraska Supreme
Court found that an arbitration clause, valid under § 2 of the FAA, was unenforceable.
1970]
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CONCLUSION
The utility of commercial arbitration is impaired by both the
lack of uniformity in state arbitration laws and the failure of the FAA
to afford federal jurisdiction. Two solutions present themselves. First,
Congress should define the circumstances under which parties may
have access to the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements
in contracts involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions.4 6
It could, for example, stipulate that for all claims arising under the
Arbitration Act, federal-question jurisdiction is available without
regard to the amount in controversy. Second, the states, for their part,
should undertake the "herculean task" of enacting uniform laws of arbi-
tration.4 7 Many state arbitration laws fail to provide any procedural
guidelines for resolving concurrent attempts to litigate and arbitrate
a controversy or for requiring a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbi-
tration. Provisions covering these problems are an essential part of
any modern arbitration statute.48 Adoption of the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act49 would mitigate the converse Erie problems presently facing
the state courts; the Uniform Act provides a mechanism for specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements and largely duplicates the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. ° Thus the states would not have to shape arbi-
46 Some differences in remedy and procedure are inescapable if the different
governments are to retain a measure of independence in deciding how justice
should be administered. If the differences become so conspicuous as to affect
advance calculations of outcome, and so to induce an undesirable shopping
between forums, the remedy does not lie in the sacrifice of the independence of
either government. It lies rather in provision by the federal government, confident
of the justice of its own procedure, of a federal forum equally accessible to both
litigants.
Hart, supra note 20, at 508.
47 See Carb, The Need for Uniform Laws of Arbitration, 15 Bus. I.Aw. 37 (1959).
48 Four essential elements of modern arbitration statutes are:
1. the irrevocability of any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration;
2. the power of a party, pursuant to a court directive, to compel a recalcitrant
party to proceed to arbitration;
3. the provision that any court action instituted in violation of an arbitration
agreement may be stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken
place;
4. the authority of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies when the
parties do not make the designation ....
M. DOMK, COMMERCiAL ARBrRATION 18-19 (1965).
49 9 U.L.A. 78-85 (1957). A total of 11 states have adopted the Uniform Act; Alaska,
Arkansas, Indiana, and Maine have adopted the Uniform Act within the past two years.
50 Section I of the Uniform Act makes executory arbitration agreements valid, en-
forceable, and irrevocable; § 2(a) provides for the specific enforcement of an arbitration
clause; § 2(d) provides for stay of an action involving an issue subject to arbitration; § 3
provides for the appointment of arbitrators by the court. 9 U.L.A. 78, 79 (1957).
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tration remedies whenever federal claims were presented in their
courts.
Neither solution is likely to be forthcoming. Enforcement of the
federal statute and the federal policy favoring commercial arbitration
is therefore likely to devolve upon the state courts. When it does, the
state courts should follow the suggested converse Erie approach and
implement the Federal Act in the way the Rederi court has done. This
subservience of state procedural rules should lessen the uncertainty
caused by the absence of express procedural paths for resolving ques-
tions concerning the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
Warren E. George, Jr.
